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Implicit Theories and Conceptions of Morality 
Chi-yue Chiu 
University of Hong Kong 
Carol S. Dweck 
Columbia University 
Jennifer Yuk-yue Tong and Jeanne Ho-ying Fu 
University of Hong Kong 
In this article, the authors propose that individuals' moral beliefs are linked to their implicit heories 
about the nature (i.e., malleability) of their social-moral reality. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that when individuals believe in a fixed reality (entity theory), they tend to hold moral beliefs in 
which duties within the given system are seen as fundamental. In contrast, when individuals believe 
in a malleable reality (incremental theory), one that can be shaped by individuals, they hold moral 
beliefs that focus on moral principles, such as human rights, around which that reality should be 
organized. Results from 5 studies supported the proposed framework: Implicit theories about the 
malleability of one's social-moral reality predicted uty-based vs. rights-based moral beliefs. 
Moral philosophers have long noticed that every moral belief 
embodies an implicit theory of the society and an implicit theory 
of the person (see, e.g., Sandel, 1984). Indeed, the idea that 
implicit theories are central to people's moral beliefs has found 
its way into major psychological theories of human morality 
(Hogan & Emler, 1978; Sampson, 1983; Shweder & Bourne, 
1982; Shweder & Miller, 1985; see also Turiel, 1994). In this 
article, we are interested in how individuals conceive of morality 
(i.e., how they justify the moral rightness of human actions), 
and in how their conceptions of morality are related to their 
implicit theories about the world and people's character. 
In a broader context, it has also been suggested that individu- 
als' moral beliefs and their implicit theories about the nature of 
the world and people are coherently organized into a belief, or 
meaning, system (Epstein, 1989; Janoff-Bulman, 1985; see also 
Johnson, Germer, Efran, & Overton, 1988; Murphy & Medin, 
1985; Schwartz, 1992). For example, Epstein (1989) proposed 
that individuals extract moral values from their experiences 
within an implicit theory of reality, which contains a theory of 
the person and a theory of the world. In this article, we also 
suggest how moral beliefs and implicit theories form a coherent 
meaning system for an individual. 
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Duty-Based Versus R ights -Based Moral i ty  
With respect o conceptions of morality, Dworkin ( 1978; see 
also Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987; Shweder & Miller, 
1985 ) has identified two main classes of moral beliefs: (a) duty- 
based moral beliefs, in which duty is the fundamental justifica- 
tion for the moral rightness of human action, and (b) rights- 
based moral beliefs, in which human rights are the fundamental 
justification for the moral rightness of human action. ~ Dworkin 
has suggested that although all ethical codes have some place 
for individual duties and individual rights, they differ in the 
priority given to one over the other. A duty-based morality would 
take some duty (such as the duty to fulfill one's role expecta- 
tions) as fundamental whereas a rights-based morality would 
take some right (such as the right to equal opportunity) as 
fundamental. 
There are several reasons that an individual's implicit theories 
about the world and people's morality should predict duty-based 
or rights-based morality. 
First, among the most basic elements in a moral belief are 
the agents of moral act ions--most typically other people or the 
world and its institutions. Because other people and the world 
are the sources of moral actions, people's beliefs about these 
factors should have important implications for their moral be- 
liefs. People can believe, for example, that the world and its 
people have fixed natures, that is, that they live in a world of 
fixed givens. Alternatively, they can believe that the world, its 
institutions, and its people have a character that can be shaped. 
In this article, we propose that implicit theories about the fixed- 
ness or malleability of the world and human character are sys- 
~A third kind of moral belief identified by Dworkin (1978) is the 
goal-based belief, which takes some goal as fundamental. However, 
unlike duty-based and rights-based morality, which are both predicated 
on conceptions ofan individual's choices and conduct in a society, goal- 
based morality is predicated on conceptions of the goals of politics and 
is hence more remote from the present analysis. 
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tematically related to individual's duty based versus rights 
based. 
As noted, individuals may conceive of the world and people's 
character as fixed entities, or they may conceive of them as 
more fluid, malleable variables (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; 
Dweck, 1991 ). Individuals holding the former belief are referred 
to as entity theorists, because they believe that these factors are 
static entities that cannot be molded or changed; individuals 
holding the latter belief are known as incremental theorists, 
because they believe that these factors can be shaped, cultivated, 
or improved. 
When individuals believe that they live in a fixed reality with 
a rigid moral order, perhaps the most important criterion for 
deciding the morality of a state of affairs is whether the moral 
agents (people and social institutions) have carried out the du- 
ties prescribed by the existing moral order. However, when indi- 
viduals believe that the world they live in is malleable, they may 
instead seek principles in terms of which the world should be 
shaped. That is, the authority of the existing moral order is no 
longer absolute, and one's duty within it is not the primary 
concern. Instead, to them the primary concern would be to 
identify, work toward, and uphold principles (such as respect 
for human rights) that will guide the society and its moral 
agents. The defining issue of morality becomes whether such 
principles or rights are fostered and protected. Thus, we hypoth- 
esized that individuals who have an entity theory of the world 
and moral character would have a greater preference for duty- 
based moral beliefs than those who have an incremental theory. 
Conversely, we predicted that individuals who have an incre- 
mental theory of the world and moral character would have a 
greater preference for rights-based morality than those who have 
an entity theory. 
Second, when one believes in a fixed social-moral reality, 
one may invest in the status quo, and one's moral orientation 
would be toward supporting the status quo. By contrast, when 
one believes in a more dynamic, malleable social-moral reality, 
one should be oriented toward moral beliefs that allow and 
support changes. Whereas duty-based morality is a system-ori- 
ented morality that serves to maintain the status quo, rights- 
based morality is a person-centered morality that promotes o- 
cial change. 
Indeed, there is evidence that a moral code that emphasizes 
duties and rules, with its focus on sanctioning deviance, may 
function to maintain the status quo and hence social stability 
(Stauh, 1989). In contrast, the relation between rights-based 
beliefs and an orientation toward social change is well illustrated 
in the Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States 
of America, 1776, which states, 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, hat all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien- 
able Rights . . . .  That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men . . . .  That whenever any form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to 
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government. 
The Declaration of Independence learly endorses a rights-based 
morality and the view that even long-established social and polit- 
ical institutions can and should be changed when these institu- 
tions violate people's rights. 
Observing the rapid social political changes in Eastern Europe 
in the late 1980s, political philosopher Robert Heilbroner ( 1991 ) 
reached the same conclusion as we did about the relation be- 
tween implicit theories and moral beliefs. On the basis of his 
observations, Heilbroner ( 1991 ) concluded that the fundamental 
difference between political thought hat emphasizes individual 
rights and political thought hat emphasizes preservation of the 
status quo (e.g., existing norms and duties) "l ies in the diametri- 
cally opposed assumptions as to the fixity or malleability of 
human behavior," whether it is believed "that there is a core 
[in human nature] that resists historical change" or that human 
nature is "plastic and therefore capable of being shaped through 
social experience" (p. 20). 
For the above reasons, we predicted' that an entity theory 
of the world and moral character would be associated with a 
preference for duty-based moral beliefs, beliefs that serve to 
maintain the status quo, and that an incremental theory would 
be associated with a preference for rights-based moral beliefs, 
beliefs that allow, promote, and guide social change. 
Overv iew of  the Studies 
In the present research, the hypothesized relation between 
individuals' implicit theory and their conception of morality was 
tested in five studies. In Study 1, we asked participants to choose 
between statements depicting a duty-based moral belief and 
statements depicting a rights-based moral belief. In Study 2, we 
confronted the participants with a particular moral belief and 
allowed them to disagree with, correct, and argue against it. In 
Studies 3 and 4, duty-based morality and rights-based morality 
were operationalized through their implications for reward and 
punishment assignment. To establish the cross-cultural general- 
ity of our findings, in Study 5, we examined the relation of 
implicit theories and duty- versus rights-based morality in a 
Chinese society, which, when compared with America, was ex- 
pected to be a relatively duty-based society. In each study, we 
predicted a stronger preference for duty-based morality and a 
weaker preference for rights-based morality among entity theo- 
rists than among incremental theorists. 
Study 1 
Me~od 
Participants. The participants were 121 undergraduate students (58 
men, 63 women) at Columbia University. Among them, 80 were intro- 
ductory psychology students who participated in the study to fulfill 
course requirements. The remaining 41 were paid $5.00 for their partici- 
pation in the study. The average age of participants was 19.86 years (SD 
= 2.84). 
Assessment ofimplicit heories. Participants' implicit heories about 
the malleability of people's moral character and the world were assessed 
by an implicit theories of morality measure and an implicit theories of 
the world measure, respectively (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b), which 
were modeled on the theories of intelligence measure developed by 
Dweck and Henderson (1988). The theories of intelligence measure 
consisted of three items, each depicting intelligence as a fixed entity 
(e.g., "You have a certain amount of intelligence and you really can't 
do much to change it"). Participants were asked to indicate how much 
they agree with the item on a 6-point scale, from 1 (very strongly agree) 
to 6 (very strongly disagree). Those with high scores on this measure 
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were considered incremental theorists and those with low scores were 
considered entity theorists in the domain of intelligence. 
The implicit theories of morality measure and the implicit theories of 
the world measure had the same format as the implicit intelligence theory 
measure. The implicit theories of morality measure consisted of three 
items, each depicting an entity view of people's morality (e.g., "A  
person's moral character is something very basic about them and it 
can't be changed much"). The implicit theories of the world measure 
consisted of three items, each depicting an entity view of the world 
(e.g., "Some societal trends may dominate for a while, but the funda- 
mental nature of our world is something that cannot be changed much" ). 
All the items are presented in Table 1. Respondents were instructed to 
indicate their degree of agreement with each item on a 6-point scale, 
from 1 (very strongly agree) to 6 (very strongly disagree). Low scores 
on these items represented ndorsement of an entity theory; high scores 
(disagreement with nonmalleability) were taken to be endorsement of
an incremental theory in these domains. 
Unlike other individual differences measures, which are intended to 
measure generalized needs or cognitive styles, implicit theory of mallea- 
bility is a unidimensional construct defined by a unitary idea. To avoid 
continued repetition of this idea, which is not necessary for high reliabil- 
ity (see below) and was irksome for our participants, only a small 
number of items were included in the measure. 
Items depicting the incremental theories were not included in the 
implicit theory measures because pilot studies howed that most partici- 
pants, when reading an explicit statement of the incremental theory, drift 
toward these choices over items. This suggests that the incremental 
items are compelling. However, to ensure that disagreement did in fact 
represent endorsement of an incremental theory, we asked an independent 
sample of 60 participants ojustify their responses. All participants who 
disagreed with the entity theory statements (n = 25) spontaneously 
espoused an incremental theory (see Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a for 
more details). 
Moreover, Levy and Dweck (1996) obtained direct evidence that 
disagreement with an entity theory on the present measure can be taken to 
represent agreement with incremental theory. They developed expanded 
measures of implicit theories. For each domain (e.g., the moral domain), 
the measure consists of eight items, four entity items (the three entity 
items in the present measure and one additional one) and four incremen- 
tal items. To make the incremental theory items less socially desirable, 
Levy and Dweck used incremental items that depict a strong form of 
incremental theory (e.g., "The basic moral characteristics of a person 
Table 1 
Factor Structure of the Theory Measures in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Factor loading 
Item ¸ 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
1 2 3 .  1 2 3 1 2 3 
Measure of world theories 
Though some phenomena can be changed, 
it is unlikely that the core dispositions 
of the world can be altered, .14 .06 .84 - .08 - .08 .83 .18 .04 .79 
Our world has its basic and ingrained 
dispositions, and you really can't do 
much to change it. .21 .16 .78 .28 .03 .85 .14 .22 .71 
Some societal trends may dominate for a 
while, but the fundamental nature of 
our world is something that cannot be 
changed much. .12 .19 .77 .11 .06 .84 .02 .14 .63 
Measure of morality theories 
A person's moral character is something 
very basic about them and it can't be 
changed much. .00 .86 .15 .07 .85 .00 - .04 .70 .31 
Whether a person is responsible and 
sincere or not is deeply ingrained in 
their personality. It cannot be changed 
very much. .08 .76 .12 .13 .83 .01 .14 .80 .02 
There is not much that can be done to 
change a person's moral waits (e.g., 
conscientiousness, uprightness, and 
honesty). .06 .90 .12 .07 .93 -.01 .10 .95 .18 
Measure ofintell igencetheodes 
YOU have a certain amount of intelligence 
and you really can't do much to change 
it. .96 .04 .17 .95 .13 .20 
Yourintelligence is something about you 
that you can't change much. .84 .06 .16 .92 .16 .20 
You can learn newthings, but you can't 
really change your basic intelligence. .88 .06 .16 .83 .04 .23 
.95 .01 .15 
.96 .05 .14 
.91 .16 .08 
Note. Values in boldface are factor loadings above .70. 
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can be changed significantly, no matter who this person is"; "Even the 
most basic moral qualities of a person can be changed" ). These items 
appear to have avoided the overly compelling nature of the incremental 
items. Validation studies performed in both the United States and Hong 
Kong revealed a huge overlap in the classification of incremental theo- 
rists on the present and the expanded measures. For example, in one 
study, 120 participants filled out the expanded measure of implicit theo- 
ries of morality. Of those who were classified as incremental theorists 
on the present measure, 91% were classified as incremental theorists on 
the expanded measure (meaning that those who disagreed with entity 
theory statements on the previous measure agreed with the incremental 
statements on the expanded measure). Of those who were classified as 
entity theorists on the present measure, 86% were classified as entity 
theorists on the expanded measure (meaning that they disagreed with 
incremental statements on the expanded measure). The correlation be- 
tween the present measure (which consists of entity items only) and the 
expanded measure was .88. A factor analysis performed on the expanded 
measure showed that the first factor had an eigenvalue of 4.14, account- 
ing for 52% of the total matrix variance, and was the only factor with 
eigenvalue greater than 1. All the incremental items had positive loading 
(> .50), and all the entity items had negative loading (< - .67)  on the 
first factor. Together, these findings howed that disagreement with entity 
items on the implicit theory measures can be taken to represent agree- 
ment with incremental items. 
Entity versus incremental theories of intelligence were also measured 
to assess possible method variance due to the format of the theory 
measures. 
Extensive vidence attesting to the reliability and validity of the theory 
measures i reported in Dweck et al. (1995b). The test-retest reliability 
for a 2-week interval is .79 for the world theory measure, .80 for the 
morality theory measure, and .80 for intelligence theory measure. As 
far as convergent validity is concerned, each implicit theory predicts 
theoretically meaningful patterns of judgments, inferences, and responses 
(Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Hong & Chiu, 1997; see Dweck et al., 
1995b; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993, for reviews). For example, agree- 
ment with an entity theory of morality is positively related to the tendency 
to infer fixed moral traits from moral behavior (Chiu et al., 1997). Hong 
and Chiu (1997) also reported evidence that agreement with an entity 
theory of the world is positively related to tendency to perceive the 
Sino-Hong Kong relations during the 1997 political transition in Hong 
Kong as part of an unchangeable r ality. 
None of the three measures correlates with standard measures of self- 
presentation concerns (the Social Desirability Scale, Paulhus, 1984, or 
the Self-Monitoring Scale, Snyder, 1974), intellectual abilities (SAT 
scores or the Academic Promise Test, Bennett et al., 1965 ), self-esteem 
(the Self-Esteem Inventory, Coopersmith, 1967), or political attitudes 
(conservatism and liberalism scales, Kerlinger, 1984), indicating that 
the implicit theory measures are not confounded with these other vari- 
ables (see Dweck et al., 1995b). 
Finally, to ensure that the relation between participants' implicit theo- 
ries and their endorsement of a particular moral belief was not mediated 
by their confidence in other people's morality or with their satisfaction 
with the world, we also assessed the participants' atisfaction with (or 
perceived "goodness" of) people's morality and the world. The confi- 
dence-satisfaction measure consisted of six pairs of items (e.g., "I 
believe that most people will take advantage of others if they can" vs. 
"I believe that most people are trustworthy"; "In general, I am satisfied 
with the world and the way it is" vs. "In general, I am disappointed 
of the world and the way it is" ). The participants were asked to choose 
one statement from each pair and rate it using a 3-point scale, ranging 
from 1 (very true for me) to 3 (sort of true for me). Responses to each 
item were later recoded into a scale from 1 to 6 with a higher score 
indicating higher confidence and satisfaction. The unweighted mean of 
the six items (with c~ = .81 ) was used to form the confidence-satisfac- 
tion measure. 
To further explore the discriminant validity of the implicit theories 
measures, participants also filled out Levenson's (1974) locus of control 
questionnaire. 
Assessment of moral beliefs. Four statements were used to assess 
the extent o which participants endorsed uty-based versus rights-based 
moral beliefs. Two of these statements embodied a violation of moral 
principles that are based on moral duties prescribed by norms, social 
roles, laws, and the rule of equity; two embodied a violation of moral 
principles that are based on individual rights or the right to equal oppor- 
tunity. Each statement was pitted against every other statement, and 
participants were asked to choose the one that was more unacceptable 
for them. We chose to ask the participants how unacceptable violation 
of a particular moral principle was for them rather than directly asking 
them how important this principle was to them because our pilot data 
suggested that how important a moral rule is for a person will become 
more apparent when it is violated (see also Karniol & Miller, 1981 ). 
These statements were (a) "People do not follow the norms and rules 
of society and do not act according to what is expected of their roles" 
(norms and role expectations); (b) "People who have made contribu- 
tions to society are not rewarded and people who break the law and 
order of society are not punished" (equity and laws); (c) "People do 
not respect one another's individuality, self-esteem and human rights" 
(individual rights ); and (d) "Our society does not provide equal oppor- 
tunity to everybody" (equal opportunity). Norms and role expectations 
along with equity and laws are duty-based morality because they are 
concerned with conformity tothe duties prescribed by some preexisting 
social arrangements (e.g., norms, role expectations, laws). In contrast, 
individual rights and equal opportunity are rights-based beliefs, because 
they demand that liberty and equal rights be the fundamental justifica- 
tions for social arrangements--that is, social arrangements should be 
made in a way that assures each individual maximum liberty and a 
maximum likelihood of fulfilling his or her potential. 2 
Procedures. The questionnaires were administered to the partici- 
pants by a female experimenter in groups of 3 to 15 in the following 
order: the implicit theories measures, the locus of control inventory, and 
finally the moral beliefs questionnaire. 
Resu l~ 
As an overview, we found that the reliabil ity o f  the theory 
measures  was h igh and that there were clear systemat ic  relation- 
ships between individuals '  impl ic it  theories and their moral  
beliefs. 
Factorial structures and reliability of the theory measures. 
The nine i tems measur ing  implicit  theories about the mal leabi l -  
ity of  the world, peop le ' s  morality, and intel l igence were sub- 
jected to factor analysis.  Three factors, wh ich  accounted for 
85% of  the matr ix  variance, were extracted on the basis o f  the 
result of  the scree test. The factors were rotated to an orthogonal  
structure us ing the var imax procedure to facil itate interpretation, 
2 In this questionnaire, we also measured other moral beliefs. Because 
these beliefs are not relevant to duty-based or rights-based beliefs, they 
were not included in the analyses reported. Examples of these beliefs 
are: "The procedures used in allocating social goods are flawed because 
of personal biases and corruption" (procedural justice belief) and "Our 
privileges and responsibilities are not clearly delineated in our Constitu- 
tion and our laws are not effectively enforced" (legal justice belief). 
As predicted, however, entity and incremental theorists did not differ in 
their endorsement of these beliefs. 
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and the rotated factor loading matrix is presented in Table 1. 
As shown in Table 1, a simple factor structure merged. The 
three intelligence theory items loaded highly on Factor 1 (Ioad- 
ings ranged from .88 to .96), whereas the three people's moral- 
ity theory items loaded highly on Factor 2 (loadings ranged 
from .76 to .90), and the three world theory items loaded highly 
on Factor 3 (loadings ranged from .77 to .84). Other factor 
loadings were below .31. The results uggest that theories about 
intelligence, people's morality, and the world are independent 
of one another. This independence suggests that the participants' 
endorsement of the theories was not due to an acquiescence s t 
or to method variance. 
Three scales were then constituted to index world theory, 
morality theory, and intelligence theory, using the unweighted 
means of their respective items (a = .86 for the world theory, 
.89 for the morality theory, and .96 for the intelligence theory). 
In order to include only those participants who were clearly 
entity theorists and those who were clearly incremental theorists, 
we included in the subsequent analyses only those participants 
who scored above the midpoint (3.5, range from 1 to 6) on 
both the morality theory and the world theory (incremental 
theorists, n --- 32) and those who scored below the midpoint on 
both theory measures (entity theorists, n --- 35 ). However, given 
that these two theory measures were statistically independent, 
we also present results from analyses in which the contributions 
of the two theories to moral beliefs were independently assessed 
and no participants were excluded. 
Moral beliefs. In our moral beliefs questionnaire, the four 
moral beliefs were pitted against one another, forming 6 items. 
Participants were required to check one belief on each item. To 
explore the relation between moral beliefs and implicit heories 
about he world and people's morality, we compared how many 
entity theorists and incremental theorists chose each of the be- 
liefs. Because the statements depicting the rights-based moral 
beliefs were more appealing for American students, the focus 
of our analyses i  on the between-group differences in the per- 
centages of participants choosing a particular belief rather than 
on the absolute percentage of people choosing the belief. For 
example, most participants (88%) in the present study chose 
individual rights when it was pitted against norms and role 
expectations. However, given this, incremental theorists, com- 
pared with entity theorists, till showed a significantly greater 
tendency to choose individual rights rather than norms and role 
expectations (97% vs. 80%). 
As shown in Table 2, every time a rights-based belief was 
pitted against a duty-based belief, significantly more incremen- 
tal theorists than entity theorists chose the rights-based belief 
(meaning, of course, that significantly more entity theorists than 
incremental theorists chose the duty-based belief). However, 
when the two duty-based beliefs were pitted against each other, 
or when the two rights-based beliefs were pitted against each 
other, entity and incremental theorists did not differ significantly 
in their preference for one belief over the other. Thus, our major 
hypothesis was supported. 
Next, a discriminant function analysis was performed on the 
four items on which a duty-based belief was pitted against a 
rights-based belief. The predictors were the world theory, the 
morality theory, the confidence-satisfaction measure, and the 
three locus of control scales (expectancies of control by internal 
factors, by powerful others, and by chance).3 All the participants 
were included in these analyses. The results of these analyses 
are presented in Table 3. As revealed in Table 3, when the 
item involving individual rights (a principle that focuses on the 
individual) was pitted against the two duty-based beliefs, those 
who held a malleable view of people' s morality, compared with 
participants who held an entity view of morality, were signifi- 
cantly more likely to choose individual rights. When equal op- 
portunity (a principle that focuses on societal structure), an- 
other ights-based belief, was pitted against the two duty-based 
beliefs, participants who held a malleable view of the world 
were more likely to choose the rights-based belief. 
These findings are consistent with the distinction between 
microjustice and macrojustice in the literature on moral values 
(Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981 ). Microjustice refers 
to those properties in interpersonal relationships that would 
make the relationships seem either fair or unfair. In contrast, 
macrojustice r fers to those integral properties characteristic of
the whole social system that would make the system appear to 
be just or unjust. This framework can be used to understand the 
difference between liberty and equal opportunity. Although a 
commitment to liberty can be a principle on which a society is 
based, it is usually evaluated at the interpersonal level in terms 
of whether agents of morality respect one another' s individuality, 
esteem, and rights. These demands are more applicable in the 
interpersonal realm (microjustice), whereas equality of oppor- 
tunity is a structural property of a social system that can be 
evaluated only across the society as a whole (macrojustice). 
Our study showed that preference for microjustice beliefs could 
be predicted better by theories of individuals' moral attributes, 
whereas the preference for macrojustice beliefs could be pre- 
dicted better by theories of the whole social system or the world. 
Thus, while the more general implicit theories measure (e.g., 
a composite index of world and morality theories) predicted 
preferences for duty-based versus rights-based moral beliefs, 
more specific implicit heories measures predicted preferences 
for specific rights-based moral beliefs over duty-based beliefs. 
Because we were more interested inpredicting people's general 
preference for duty-based versus rights-based morality, in the 
next four studies, our analysis focuses on the more general 
theory (world and morality). 
As Table 3 also shows, internal locus of control predicted a
preference for duty-based moral beliefs over individual rights. 
This finding is consistent with previous research findings that 
individuals with an internal locus of control tend to be more 
approving of the existing social order and its accompanying 
social expectations and duties (e.g., Carroll, Perkowitz, Luri- 
gio, & Weaver, 1987; Lipkus, 1991). Finally, there were no 
systematic relations between the preference for duty-based ver- 
sus rights-based moral beliefs and other predictors (the confi- 
dence-satisfaction measure and the external locus of control 
measures). 
3 We also included the participants' gender in our original discriminant 
function analyses. However, because no significant gender effect was 
found in these analyses, this variable was dropped in our final analysis. 
No gender effects (main effects or interactions) were found in Studies 
2, 3, 4, or 5, and thus gender was not included as a factor in the analyses 
reported. 
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Table 2 
Preferences for Moral Beliefs as a Function of Theories About 
the Worm and People's Morality 
Choice 
Entity 
theorists 
(%) 
Incremental 
theorists 
(%) 
z value for 
difference in 
proportions 
Equal opportunity rather than equity 
and laws 43 73 -2.61" 
Equal opportunity rather than norms 
and role expectation 83 97 -1.99" 
Individual fights rather than equity 
and laws 66 87 -2.11 * 
Individual rights rather than norm 
and role expectation 80 97 -2.30* 
Equal opportunity rather than 
individual rights 43 47 -0.33 
Equity and laws rather than norm 
and role expectation 80 87 -0.78 
* p < .05. 
In summary, participants' implicit theories were related to 
their moral beliefs in the predicted directions. Taken together, 
the findings from this study provide prel iminary support for 
the hypothesized relation between implicit theories and moral 
beliefs. 
S tudy  2 
To further explore the relation between implicit theories and 
moral beliefs, we assessed the moral beliefs of  the participants in 
this study through a belief confrontation technique. Participants 
were confronted with a particular moral bel ief  and were al lowed 
to disagree with, correct, and argue against it. Again, we pre- 
dicted that individuals who believe that the world and other 
people 's  morality are fixed would be more likely to display a 
duty-based versus r ights-based morality on this measure com- 
pared with individuals who think that the world and other peo- 
p le 's  morality are malleable or cultivatable. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 81 Columbia University students 
(41 men, 40 women) who had not participated in Study 1. They were 
paid $5.00 for their participation. 
Measures of implicit heories. Participants' implicit theories about 
the world, people's morality, and intelligence were measured by means 
of the same questionnaires u ed in Study 1. As shown in Table 1, the 
factorial structure of the theories found in Study 1 was successfully 
replicated. 
The belief confrontation technique. A belief confrontation technique 
was developed to measure the participants' duty-based versus rights- 
based moral beliefs. The aim of this technique was to present individuals 
with a passage that expressed a particular moral belief in a way that 
allowed them to spontaneously generate their own moral beliefs if they 
had different beliefs. At the same time, the range of responses was 
constrained, because all responses were focused on a central theme. 
Three passages were used in the present study to assess different facets 
of duty-based morality versus rights-based morality. 
The first passage xpressed a prototypical duty-based moral belief, 
as described in Dworkin (1978). The participants were first asked to 
rate the extent o which they agreed with this passage on a 4-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Then, they 
were asked to cross out parts of the passage they disagreed with and to 
make corrections on the passage so that the corrected passage would 
correspond as closely as possible to their own beliefs. The presented 
passage was: 
People are capable of adhering to society's minimal standards of 
morality. Therefore, it is the duty of every person to meet these 
Table 3 
Preferences for Moral Beliefs as a Function of Implicit Theories and Confidence and Locus of Control 
Incremental theory Incremental theory Confidence- Internal Control by Control by 
Choice of morality of the world satisfaction control powerful others chance 
Equal opportunity rather than equity 
and laws 
Equal opportunity over norms rather 
than role expectation 
Individual fights rather than equity 
and laws 
Individual fights rather than norm 
and role expectation 
• 81 (.06) .57 (.05) 
.93 (.03) - .50 (.04) 
.77 (.05) - .73 (.06) 
.36 (.01) .58 (.01) - .55 (.01) - .40 (.01) 
.60 (.07) 
- .60 (.04) 
Note. Only standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients that were significant at or below the. 10 level are shown. Level of significance 
is indicated in parentheses. 
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standards, and people who fail to adhere to these standards should 
be held responsible for their deeds. 
One advantage of using the belief confrontation technique is that 
compared with presenting a single statement of duty-based or rights- 
based morality, presenting a passage on moral issues olicits more spon- 
taneous cognitive responding from participants. However, as each pas- 
sage in the current study contained many different ideas, some of which 
are not germane to duty-based versus rights-based morality, the ratings 
provided by the participants could not be used directly in scoring the 
participants' moral beliefs. Thus, we developed the following coding 
scheme for participants' responses. 
Agreement responses (scored as 1 ): Participants' responses were 
coded as duty-based (a) when the participants checked either mostly 
agree or strongly agree on the rating scale without making any 
changes on the passage or (b) when, regardless of their rating, they 
suggested some modifications or qualifications of the passage, but 
these modifications or qualifications did not alter the theme of the 
passage• For example: "People are capable of adhering to society's 
minimal standards of morality. Therefore, it is the duty of every 
person to meet these standards, and people who fail to adhere to 
these standards will eventually be held responsible for their deeds 
in the long run." 
Disagreement responses (scored as -1 ) :  The participants' re- 
sponses were coded as rights-based (a) when the participants 
checked either mostly disagree or strongly disagree, even when they 
did not indicate specifically how they would alter the passage or 
(b) when, regardless of their rating, they indicated that the passage 
should be changed, and these changes were in conflict with the 
original (duty-based) theme of the passage. For example: "People 
are capable of . . . should be held responsible for their deeds• 
However, the laws of society should not interfere with the basic 
rights of the individual. Laws should protect society, not force 
conformity." 
The other two passages were extracted from Dworkin (1978). One 
passage pitted the society's urvival against human rights: 
In a modern society there are a variety of moral principles which 
some men adopt for their own guidance and do not attempt o 
impose upon others. There are also moral standards which the ma- 
jority places beyond toleration and imposes upon those who dissent 
• . . A society cannot survive unless some standards are of the 
second class, because some moral conformity is essential to its life. 
Every society has a right to preserve its own existence, and the 
right to insist on some such conformity. 
The other passage pitted the protection of community mores against he 
right to freedom of expression: 
Banning pornography abridges the freedom of authors, publishers 
and would-be readers . . . .  The public at present believes that hard- 
core pornography is immoral, that those who produce it are pander- 
ers, and that the protection of the community's sexual and related 
mores is sufficiently important to justify restricting their freedom• 
Because some participants disagreed with the irrelevant parts of the 
passages, Passages 2 and 3 were scored differently. In coding Passage 
2, the emphasis was on the thematic sentence "Every society has a right 
to preserve its own existence, and the right to insist on some such 
conformity." Responses were assigned a score of - 1 if the participants 
deleted this sentence or made alterations or comments that suggested 
that societal survival cannot be used to justify the imposition of moral 
conformity. Examples of these alterations or comments, hown in italics, 
are: 
• . . some moral conformity of how one deals with another is 
essential to its life. Every society has to preserve the freedom of 
its members, and therefore the right to teach others to respect he 
rights of others. 
Conformity may not always be good if what society wishes to 
impose upon people goes against heir beliefs. 
Other responses were assigned a score of 1. 
The focus of analysis for Passage 3 was on the sentence "The protec- 
tion of the community's sexual and related mores is sufficiently im- 
portant o justify restricting their freedom." For this passage, responses 
were accorded a score of - 1 when the participants deleted this sentence 
or made alterations or comments that suggested that protection of social 
mores does not justify restriction of the right to free expression• Exam- 
pies of these comments or alterations are: 
The protection of the community's sexual and related mores is not 
sufficiently important to justify restricting people's freedom• 
We are not entitled to abridge the rights of others simply because 
of personal standards or moral standards grounded on conformity. 
Freedom of speech remains of ultimate importance. 
All other responses to these statements were assigned a score of 1. 
Two independent coders who were blind to the participants' other 
measures coded the participants' responses to these passages• The in- 
tercoder agreement for Passages 1, 2, and 3, respectively, was 93% (K 
= .84), 93% (K = .76), and 89% (K = .72). It should be noted that 
the measures and the coding scheme were designed in a way that is 
strongly biased against rights-based morality. The passages were persua- 
sive messages written by duty-based morality advocates (see Dworkin, 
1978), and the alterations generated by the participants had to be clearly 
consistent with rights-based morality in order for them to be coded as 
rights-based responses. Otherwise, the responses were classified as duty- 
based responses. Accordingly, the distribution of scores on these mea- 
sures was expected to be strongly skewed toward duty-based morality. 
Thus, to facilitate interpretation, we transformed the raw scores on these 
measures into z scores before we analyzed the data, although analyses 
performed on the raw scores yielded results identical to analyses per- 
formed on the transformed scores. Our prediction was that entity theo- 
rists would have higher scores (indicating stronger duty-based or weaker 
rights-based moral beliefs) than incremental theorists on all of the three 
items• 
To rule out the possibility that participants' duty-based versus rights- 
based responses on these measures would be confounded by a general 
tendency to agree or by a reluctance to make alterations or comments 
on the passages, we counted the number of words deleted from and the 
number of words added to each passage for each participant. It should 
be noted that although entity theorists were expected to make fewer 
rights-based changes in target statements of passages, they might none- 
theless make changes in the other parts of the passages. Thus, we pre- 
dicted that entity theorists and incremental theorists would not necessar- 
ily differ on the above two indexes of response styles. 
Another means of assessing duty-based versus rights-based morality 
was given a preliminary test. As noted above, a crucial distinction be- 
tween a duty-based morality and a rights-based morality is whether duty 
or right is deemed as fundamental (Dworkin, 1978)• There is a differ- 
ence between "Since the government has the duty to provide equal 
opportunity to everybody, therefore, we have the right to equal opportu- 
nity" and "The government has the duty to provide equal opportunity 
to everybody, because we have the right to equal opportunity." The 
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former statement expresses a duty-based morality because in this state- 
ment, a duty is considered to be more fundamental than a right. The 
latter statement, however, is expressing a rights-based morality because 
in this statement, a right is considered to be more fundamental. As a 
preliminary test, we embedded these two items in the 40-item Dogma- 
tism Scale (Rokeach, 1960) as Item 11 and Item 32. Participants were 
asked to respond to the 42 items on a 6-point scale that ranged from 3 
(1 agree very much) to -3 (I disagree very. much). We predicted that 
entity theorists would agree more with the sentence in the duty-based 
frame than with the one in a rights-based frame, relative to incremental 
theorists, who were predicted to agree more with the rights-based versus 
duty-based sentence. 
Results 
Using the same criteria as in Study 1, we formed two groups 
(23 entity theorists and 25 incremental theorists). The results of 
this study were consistent with our predictions: Entity theorists 
exhibited a stronger belief in duty-based morality and a weaker 
belief in rights-based morality than did incremental theorists. 
Moral beliefs. First, a Theory × Passage analysis of vari- 
ance (ANOVA) was performed on the participants' responses 
to the three passages. The theory main effect was significant, 
F(  1, 42) = 10.88,p < .01. As shown in Figure 1, entity theorists 
exhibited more duty-based morality or less rights-based moral- 
ity than incremental theorists across the three passages (mean 
z score = .29 vs: - .32) .  Both the passage main effect and the 
Theory X Passage interaction effect were not significant. 
This difference, however, was not due to incremental theo- 
rists' greater willingness to make alterations or comments on 
the original statements. A Theory .x Passage x Editorial Style 
(deletion vs. addition) ANOVA was performed on the number 
of words deleted from and the number of words added to each 
statement. Although the editorial style main effect, F(  1, 42) = 
5.05, p < .05, and the Passage x Editorial Style interaction 
effect were significant, F(2,  84) = 12.94, p < .001, no theory 
effects (main effect or interactions) were significant. Therefore, 
the differences between entity theorists and incremental theorists 
on this moral belief measure were not due to a differential 
tendency to edit or comment on the passages. In summary, com- 
pared with incremental theorists, entity theorists howed greater 
agreement with duty-based morality and were less likely to make 
alterations or comments that were consistent with rights-based 
morality. 
A Theory x Frame ANOVA was performed on the partici- 
pants' ratings of the duty-based-framed and the rights-based- 
framed belief items embedded in the Dogmatism Scale. Only 
the predicted interaction effect was significant, F (1 ,42)  = 4.45, 
p < .04 in this analysis. As Figure 2 shows, when presented 
with a duty-based-framed and a rights-based-framed item, al- 
though both items asserted people's right to equal opportunity, 
incremental theorists howed stronger agreement with the rights- 
based-framed item than with the duty-based-framed item (M = 
1.71 vs. 0.55, p < .05). In contrast, entity theorists tended to 
agree more with the duty-based-framed item than with the 
rights-based-framed item (M = 0.65 vs. 0.47), although this 
difference was not significant. In summary, there was clear evi- 
dence across measures that entity theorists typically have 
stronger duty-based moral beliefs and weaker ights-based moral 
beliefs than do incremental theorists. 
Dogmatism. Four factors were extracted from the factor 
analysis performed on the Dogmatism Scale. These factors were 
consistent with those found in previous factor analytic studies 
of the Dogmatism Scale (Kerlinger & Rokeach, 1966). Factor 
1 was marked by items expressing closed-mindedness--a belief 
in one clear truth and intolerance of other opinions. Sample 
items included "Of  all different philosophies which exist in this 
world, there is probably only one which is correct" and "A  
group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among 
its own members cannot exist for long." Factor 2 was marked 
by items expressing belief in a cause, Factor 3 was marked by 
items reflecting a tendency toward proselytization, and Factor 
4 was marked by items expressing belief in strong leadership. 
In our conception, when individuals believe in a fixed reality, 
they might also believe in one truth and be less tolerant of 
divergent opinions (i.e., be closed-minded). However, individu- 
als' theories about the malleability of the reality should not have 
any systematic relationship with their commitment to a cause, 
engagement in proselytization, or belief in strong leadership. 
Thus, we would expect entity theorists to score higher than 
incremental theorists on Factor 1 (One Truth, Closed-Mind- 
edness) but not on other factors. Consistent with these expecta- 
tions, entity theorists and incremental theorists differed signifi- 
cantly only on Factor 1, F ( I ,  44) = 6.31, p < .05, with incre- 
mental theorists being less closed-minded than entity theorists 
(M = - 1.49 vs. -0 .79) .  The two theories groups, however, did 
not differ significantly on the other three factors. This finding 
provides further validation and clarification of the theories con- 
struct. An entity theory is not just what the Dogmatism Scale 
measures. Instead, it is related to the precise factor that one 
would expect, that is, the belief in one truth and the imperme- 
ability of one's belief system. 
Figure 1. Agreement with duty-based versus rights-based morality by 
entity theorists and incremental theorists. Higher scores indicate greater 
agreement with duty-based morality and lower scores indicate greater 
agreement with rights-based morality. 
Study 3 
In this study, duty-based versus rights-based morality was 
assessed by means of their implications for responses to rule 
violations. Because duty-based morality treats codes of conduct 
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Figure 2. The effects of duty-based versus rights-based framing on 
entity theorists' and incremental theorists' agreement with the right to 
equal opportunity. Scale ranged from -3  (indicating disagreement) to 
3 (indicating agreement). 
Reward and punishment allocation. To test he prediction that entity 
theorists, in comparison with incremental theorists, would recommend 
more punishment for undesirable conduct and less reward for desirable 
conduct, we adopted and modified four of the classroom scenarios origi- 
nally created by Hamilton et al. (1988). Each of these scenarios de- 
scribes either desirable or undesirable classroom behavior among rade- 
school children. Grade-school classroom conduct scenarios were used 
because moral training is an integral part of adult-child relationships. 
Accordingly, when we instructed the participants to take the role of a 
grade-school teacher, they might more readily have revealed how they 
think others should behave and why they should behave in this way. 
Indeed, previous studies using similar scenarios have been successful 
in activating duty-based morality (Hamilton et al., 1988; Hamilton, Blu- 
menfeld, Akoh, & Miura, 1990). The desirable conduct scenarios were: 
The teacher asks the class whether some of them can help her with 
the preparation work for the school open day. Judy volunteers to 
help. 
The teacher asked Jerry to remove the old posters and notices on 
the students' notice board, and Jerry does what she requested as 
soon as possible. 
The undesirable conduct scenarios were: 
as foremost, hose who willfully misbehave deserve punishment 
(Dworkin, 1978). However, good behavior is not entitled to 
reward because one is merely doing one's duty. Indeed, previous 
studies (Hamilton, Blumenfeld, & Kushler, 1988) have shown 
that individuals have a greater tendency to punish undesirable 
behavior and not to reward desirable conduct when they reason 
under a duty-based moral framework than when they do not. 
In contrast, under a rights-based morality, codes of conduct 
are merely instrumental to protect people's rights and have no 
essential value in themselves (Dworkin, 1978). Thus, a rule 
violation would not be as intrinsically serious. Instead, individu- 
als operating under a rights-based morality might be relatively 
more appreciative of good behavior and less harsh when they 
assign punishment to undesirable behavior. Thus, in this study, 
we asked the participants to assign rewards or punishment to 
school children who performed esirable or undesirable behav- 
ior. We also measured how frequently the participants provided 
duty-based arguments as justifications for their reward and pun- 
ishment assignment. We predicted that compared with incremen- 
tal theorists, entity theorists would display more punitive re- 
sponses in response to undesirable behavior and less apprecia- 
tive responses to desirable behavior. Moreover, because of 
incremental theorists' belief in the malleable nature of the so- 
c ial -moral  reality, their reactions to negative behavior should 
be directed toward changing rather than punishing the negative 
behavior. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 97 Columbia University students 
(41 men, 56 women) who participated in the study to fulfill course 
requirements in an introductory psychology course. None of them had 
participated in the previous two studies. 
Theory measures. Theories of the world and people's morality were 
measured using the same measures as in Study 1 and 2. The factor 
structure of the theory measures obtained in the prior two studies was 
again replicated (see Table 1 ). 
The teacher requires the students to clean up their desk when they 
leave the classroom, but Debby does not clean up her desk when 
she leaves. 
The teacher asked Larry to remove the old posters and notices on 
the students' notice board. A week has passed and Larry does not 
do it. 
After reading each scenario, participants were asked to give open- 
ended responses a to how they would handle the situation and to provide 
justifications for their responses. In the scenarios that depicted undesir- 
able conduct, they were also asked to indicate what they would say to 
the child if they decided to talk to him or her privately. We included 
this question because we expected that in the face of undesirable conduct, 
individuals who subscribe to a duty-based morality would tend to de- 
mand that he offenders comply unconditionally with the moral standards 
that they had failed to meet. In contrast, we expected that individuals 
who subscribe to a rights-based morality would attempt to work out 
with the offenders a mutually acceptable solution based on the principle 
of mutual respect for individual rights and esteem. Their confrontation 
style might therefore be more inquiring and negotiation oriented. 
Finally, in order to control for the possibility that entity theorists are 
simply more punitive or negative in general and not just in duty-violation 
situations, we also included four scenarios about desirable or undesirable 
achievement behavior or outcomes. Achievement behavior or outcome 
was included as a control condition because academic achievement is 
related more to fulfilling intellectual aspirations than to meeting moral 
standards. Thus, whereas academic achievement usually calls for praise 
and recognition, undesirable performance l ss often brings punishment 
(Hamilton et al., 1988). As such, the hypothesized group differences 
should have emerged in the conduct scenarios but not in the achievement 
scenarios. The instructions for the achievement scenarios were the same 
as those for the conduct scenarios. The four achievement scenarios were 
(a) "The teacher gives the class a difficult math exercise to do. Alice 
keeps trying to do it even though it's hard," (b) "Henry works diligently 
and finishes his homework," (c) "Don does poorly on his report card," 
and (d) "The teacher gives the class a difficult math exercise to do. 
Pam stops trying to do her work after making a few unsuccessful at- 
tempts." The four conduct scenarios and the four achievement scenarios 
were presented tothe participants in a randomized order, with the same 
order for each participant. 
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Open-ended responses toeach of these scenarios were coded into the 
following five dependent variables by two independent coders who were 
blind to the participants" scores on other measures: 
1. Praise-reward (only for the four scenarios that depict either desir- 
able conduct or desirable academic performance; intercoder agreement 
= 92%, K = .83 ): The participants indicated that they would either give 
a reward to the children, praise them privately or publicly, or show their 
appreciation. Some examples of these responses are: "I would say to 
Henry, 'Congratulations! You did a great job' " and "I would praise 
him and give him a sticker." 
2. Blame-punishment (only for the four scenarios that depict either 
undesirable conduct or undesirable academic performance; intercoder 
agreement = 100%, ~c = 1.00): The participants indicated that they 
would punish or blame the children. Some examples of these responses 
are: "I would scold her" and "I would chastise Larry." 
3. Duty-based justifications: The participants justified their intended 
actions by referring to the importance, necessity, or expectation of con- 
forming to a code of conduct or to the demand of the teacher (intercoder 
agreement =97%, K = .84). Some examples of duty-based justifications 
are: " . . .  because people must learn to follow directions or society 
could not function" and " . . .  because that was the rule in the 
classroom.' ' 
4. Use of directives (only for the four scenarios that depicted either 
undesirable conduct Or undesirable academic performance; intercoder 
agreement = 90%, x = .76): The participants indicated that if they 
were to talk to the children privately they would issue a command to 
the children or require that certain actions be taken by the children. 
Examples of using directives are: "Take care of the board now" and 
"Take down the posters today or you'll be in trouble." 
5. Negotiation or assurance (only for the four scenarios that depicted 
undesirable conduct or undesirable academic performance; intercoder 
agreement = 96%, K = .83): The participants indicated that if they 
were tO talk to the children privately, they would negotiate a mutually 
acceptable course of action with them, respect the children's right to 
choose whether or not to carry out a school chore, or attempt to protect 
the children's elf-esteem by assuring them of their ability to solve 
' difficult problems. Examples of such responses are: "Do you want the 
job or is it tOO much for you?" and " . . .  you have the ability and you 
only need to apply it." 
Responses that fit the coding criteria for a variable in a scenario were 
given a score of I on that variable in that scenario. Otherwise, they 
were given a score of 0 on that variable for that scenario. For each 
variable, scores for scenarios with the same domain and behavioral 
desirability were aggregated. For example, the praise-reward scores 
for two conduct scenarios depicting desirable behavior were summed. 
Accordingly, for each of the four Domain x Behavior Desirability condi- 
tions, the possible range of score for each variable was 0 to 2. 
Results 
Overview. As predicted, compared with incremental theo- 
rists, entity theorists recommended more punishment for unde- 
sirable conduct and less reward for desirable conduct. They 
also gave more duty-based justifications for their reward and 
punishment allocation, used directives more frequently, and used 
negotiation and assurance less frequently. Also as expected, 
these group differences were significant in the conduct domain 
and not in the achievement domain. 
Reward and punishment assignment. On the basis of the 
criteria used in Studies 1 and 2, 34 participants were classified 
as entity theorists and 25 were classified as incremental theorists. 
Recall that after eading each scenario, we asked the participants 
to describe how they would handle the situation if they were 
the teacher. In accord with the coding system described earlier, 
responses were coded, and a reward (or punishment) score was 
computed for each participant in each of the four Domain x 
Behavioral Desirability conditions (see Method section). We 
then performed a Theory x Domain × Behavioral Desirability 
ANOVA on these reward (punishment) scores and found a sig- 
nificant Theory X Domain X Behavioral Desirability interaction 
effect, F( 1, 57) = 5.55, p < .05. As shown in Figure 3, in the 
conduct domain, entity theorists, compared with incremental 
theorists, recommended more punishment in the case of undesir- 
able conduct (M = 0.38 vs. 0.12, possible range of 0 to "2), 
F(1,  57) = 3.85, p = .05, and less reward in the case of 
desirable conduct (M = 0.44 vs. 0.84), F(1,  57) = 4.39, p < 
.05. However, in the achievement domain, the two theory groups 
did not differ in the magnitude of either their praise (M = 1.32 
for entity theorists vs. 1.44 for incremental theorists) or blame 
(M = 0.0 for entity theorists vs. 0.003 for incremental theorists) 
assignment. These findings clearly support our hypotheses. 
Moreover, the nonsignificant theory effects in the achievement 
domain suggest hat the response pattern found in the conduct 
domain was not due to general negativity on the part of the 
entity theorists. 
The behavioral desirability main effect was significant, F( 1, 
57) = 125.43, p < .0001. Over the conduct and achievement 
scenarios, participants were more conservative in recommending 
punishment (M = 0.14) than reward (M = 0.99). Given this 
finding, it is particularly interesting that entity theorists, as can 
be seen in Figure 3, did not recommend more reward than 
punishment in the conduct domain. The domain main effect was 
also significant, F(1, 57) = 14.59, p < .001. However, this 
effect should be interpreted in light of the significant Domain 
x Behavioral Desirability interaction, F ( I ,  57) = 39.23, p < 
.0001. Specifically, more reward was recommended in the 
achievement domain (M = 1.37) than in the conduct domain 
(M = 0.61 ), p < .01, but more blame was recommended (M 
= 0.27) in the conduct domain than in the achievement domain 
(M = 0.02), p < .05. 
In summary, the findings suggest that compared with the in- 
cremental theorists, the entity theorists were more likely to rec- 
ommend punishment in the case of undesirable conduct and less 
likely to recommend reward in the case of desirable conduct. 
Duty-based justifications. Did entity theorists also tend to 
justify their reward and punishment recommendations with 
duty-based reasons? To test this hypothesis, we performed a
Theory × Domain x Behavioral Desirability ANOVA on the 
number of duty-based justifications uggested by the partici- 
pants. The theory main effect was significant, F( 1, 57) = 4.03, 
p = .05. Entity theorists, on the whole, gave more duty-based 
justifications than incremental theorists (M = 0.40 vs. 0.26). 
Although the Theory × Domain interaction was not significant, 
F( 1, 57) = 2.57, p = .1 l, as Figure 4 shows, the significant 
theory main effect was contributed to mainly by the theory 
effect in the conduct domain. Indeed, planned comparisons re- 
vealed that in the conduct domain, entity theorists uggested 
significantly more duty-based justifications than incremental 
theorists (M = 0.68 vs. 0.44), F(1, 57) = 4.14, p < .05. 
Again, the between-group difference was not significant in the 
achievement domain (M = 0.12 and 0.08 for entity theorists 
and incremental theorists, respectively, F < 1 ). 
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Figure 3. Reward and punishment assignment on open-ended responses in the conduct domain as a function 
of implicit theories about the world and people's morality. 
The domain main effect was also significant, F(1,  57) = 
54.84, p < .0001. More duty-based justifications were provided 
in the conduct domain than in the achievement domain (M = 
0.58 vs. 0.11 ), suggesting again that meeting moral standards 
was less relevant in the achievement domain than in the conduct 
domain. Finally, the Domain x Behavioral Desirability interac- 
tion was significant, F(1,  57) = 15.51, p < .0001. Follow- 
up analyses revealed that more duty-based justifications were 
suggested in the conduct domain than in the achievement domain 
for both desirable and undesirable behavior, but this difference 
was larger when the behavior was undesirable (M = 0.73 vs. 
0.19) than when the behavior was desirable (M = 0.42 vs. 
0.02), t(57) = 4.15, p < .0001. 
Figure 4. Mean number of duty-based reasons generated by ntity 
theorists and incremental theorists to ju ify their eward and punishment 
assignment in the conduct domain and in the academic domain. Scale 
ranged from 0 to 2. 
To summarize, the findings for the duty-based justifications 
support our hypothesis. Entity theorists were more likely to 
provide duty-based justifications for assigning rewards and pun- 
ishment han were incremental theorists. Again, this pattern was 
found in the conduct domain but not in the achievement domain. 
Use of directives and negotiation assurance. Finally, for 
those scenarios depicting undesirable conduct or achievement 
performance, we also asked the participants what they would 
say to the children if they were to talk to them privately. We 
expected that entity theorists would more frequently use direc- 
tives and less frequently use negotiation and assurance than 
would incremental theorists. We thus subjected the use of direc- 
tives and negotiation-assurance to two separate Theory x Do- 
main ANOVAs. The Theory x Domain interaction for the use 
of directives was significant, F(1,  57) = 8.38, p < .01. As 
shown in Figure 5, in the conduct domain, entity theorists used 
directives more frequently than incremental theorists (M = 1.17 
vs. 0.64), F(  1, 57) = 5.99, p < .05. The between-group differ- 
ence was not significant i  the achievement domain (M = 0.26 
for entity theorists and M = 0.40 for incremental theorists, F 
< 1 ), again supporting our hypothesis. Consistent with the 
reward-punishment and duty-based justification findings, the 
domain main effect was also significant, F(1, 57) = 26.64, p 
< .0001. More directives were used in the conduct domain than 
in the achievement domain (M = 0.92 vs. 0.32). 
The theory main effect for the use of negotiation and assur- 
ance was also significant, F(1, 57) = 17.06, p < .0001. Figure 
5 shows that incremental theorists mentioned the use of negotia- 
tion and assurance more frequently than entity theorists (M = 
0.32 vs. 0.09). This effect, however, cut across both domains 
instead of being localized in the conduct domain. One possible 
reason for the domain generality of this effect is that regardless 
of whether the subject of conversation was academic perfor- 
mance or conduct, incremental theorists might have perceived 
the teacher-student conversation as (a) involving two equally 
respect-worthy individuals capable of negotiating a mutually 
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Figure 5. Mean number of times entity theorists and incremental theorists mentioned the use of directives 
and the use of negotiation and assurance in the conduct domain a d in the academic domain when talking 
to children with undesirable conduct. Scale ranged from 0 to 2. 
acceptable solution and as (b )  entail ing a teaching and confi- 
dence-bui lding role for the adult. In contrast, entity theorists, 
presumably more focused on the students' duty versus rights, 
hardly mentioned the use of  negotiation and assurance at all 
when they talked to the children (M = 0.09).  
In summary, the results o f  Study 3 showed that, consistent 
with a duty-based morality, entity theorists, compared with in- 
cremental theorists, were more likely to recommend punishment 
for chi ldren with undesirable conduct and were less likely to 
recommend reward for chi ldren with desirable conduct. In con- 
trast, incremental theorists, consistent with a r ights-based moral- 
ity, focused far more on reward than on punishment in the 
conduct situation. Compared with entity theorists, they also used 
directives less frequently when talking to chi ldren with undesir- 
able conduct and used negotiation and assurance more fre- 
quently when talking with chi ldren who exhibited undesirable 
behavior in the conduct and academic domains. Moreover, the 
lack o f  significant between-group differences for most compari -  
sons in the achievement domain rules out the possibil ity that 
entity theorists'  tendency to recommend more punishment in 
the conduct domain was due to a general negativity or punitive- 
ness in interpersonal relationships. 
S tudy  4 
Method 
In Study 3, we showed that entity theorists were more punitive than 
incremental theorists in their reactions toward children who displayed 
negative conduct. However, both of the negative conduct scenarios used 
in Study 3 were scenarios of duty violation. Thus, it is unclear from 
this study whether entity theorists would also react more negatively 
toward violations of rights. Our model suggests that relative to entity 
theorists, incremental theorists, believing in the malleability of the so- 
cial-moral reality, would display more education-oriented responses 
and less punishment-oriented responses to undesirable behavior, regard- 
less of whether the undesirable behavior was a violation of duty or 
rights. However, it is also possible that compared with entity theorists, 
incremental theorists, being more concerned with protection of rights, 
would react more strongly toward rights violation and recommend 
harsher sanction for rights violation. To address this issue, we asked 
undergraduate students from Columbia University to respond to a rights 
violation scenario. Among the 98 participants (48 men, 50 women), 25 
were classified as entity theorists and 25 were classified as incremental 
theorists. After their implicit theories had been assessed in an allegedly 
unrelated study, they read the following scenario, which depicted how 
students' right to fair treatment was infringed on. We had the participants 
take the role of this student and describe what they would do in this 
situation. The scenario was as follows: 
At the beginning of an introductory calculus class, the professor 
told the class that they would be given eight problem sets throughout 
the course, each contributing 12.5% to the final grade. The professor 
also promised to set the cut-off point for an A grade at 80. After 
the seventh problem set was given back to the students, you found 
that you had already accumulated 81 points. Therefore, you did not 
finish the last problem set and spent your time preparing for the 
finals in other courses. It turned out that the professor raised the 
cut-off point to 85 because too many of the students cored above 
80. Consequently, ou only got a B+ for the course. 4 
Participants' responses were coded by two coders who were blind to 
the participants' cores on the implicit heory measures, using the follow- 
ing coding criteria. Action included meeting with the professor or his 
higher authorities (e.g., the department head or the deans). Inaction 
included acceptance of the unjust situations without protest. Responses 
that did not indicate any specific ourse of action were coded as unclassi- 
fied, about 8% of the responses (interrater agreement = 100%, K = 
4 Most rights violations can also be construed asduty violations (e.g., 
violation of a professor's duty to be honest and fair). To focus partici- 
pants' attention on rights violation, we had the participants play the role 
of the unfairly treated student. How entity and incremental theorists 
reacted to scenarios that were weighted more evenly in the two directions 
(duty violation and rights violation) was examined in Study 5. 
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1.00). Actions mentioned were further categorized into (a) actions di- 
rected toward punishment or retaliation, (b) actions directed toward 
changing the transgressor's moral behavior, or (c) other actions (in- 
terrater agreement = 96%, x = .88). The first category included action 
that was motivated by the desire to display hostility toward the professor 
or to retaliate. The second category included action that aimed at per- 
suading the professor to be fair by confronting him with a fairness 
principle. 
Results 
The two theory groups did not differ in the likelihood of 
initiating action (i.e., meeting with the professor or higher au- 
thorities), X2(2, N = 50) = 0.17, p = .92. Nineteen (out of 
25) entity theorists and 20 (out of 25) incremental theorists 
mentioned that they would initiate some action to deal with the 
rights violation. However, as predicted by our model, 21% of 
the entity theorists who intended to take action, but none of the 
incremental theorists, stated that they would seek to punish the 
professor. In contrast, 35% of the incremental theorists who 
intended to take action, in comparison with 0% of the entity 
theorists, stated they would try to persuade the professor to go 
back to the fairness principle that he had violated, X2(2, N = 
39) = 15.37, p = .0001. The following comments illustrate the 
typical punishment-oriented r sponses given by entity theorists: 
I think the professor is a junk [sic] and I would tell him. 
I'd be ticked as hell and be in the Dean's office at 9:00 the next 
morning. 
and a typical education-oriented response made by incremental 
theorists: 
I would confront the professor and remind him that he has promised 
not to raise the cut-off and that it was unfair of him to do it. He 
should not have pretended that it would be fair and should not have 
lied that he would not raise the cut-off. 
In summary, the data from Studies 3 and 4 together suggest 
that entity theorists are relatively more oriented toward punish- 
ment and that incremental theorists are more oriented toward 
education in responses to both duty violation (Study 3) and 
rights violation (Study 4).  
Study 5 
Past research as shown that American society is more rights 
oriented whereas Asian societies are more duty oriented in their 
moral orientation (e.g., Chiu & Hong, 1997; Shweder & Miller, 
1985 ). If entity versus incremental theories are related to duty- 
versus rights-based morality, are there more entity theorists in 
Asian societies than in American societies? Does the relation- 
ship between implicit theories and conceptions of morality hold 
in Asian societies as in American societies? Specifically, do 
entity and incremental theorists differ in their tendency to issue 
directives versus negotiation/reassurance when a child trans- 
gresses, and do they differ in the duty- versus rights-based justi- 
fication they give for their reaction? To answer these questions, 
we replicated Study 3 using a sample of Hong Kong Chinese, 
who have been shown to have a strong duty-based orientation 
(see Chiu & Hong, 1997). 
Method 
One hundred fifty-six Hong Kong Chinese undergraduate or junior 
college (Grade 12) students volunteered to participate in the research. 
They were given the morality theory measure and the world theory 
measure, as in Studies 1-4. Then, they responded to an artistic aptitude 
test, which was used as a filler task to conceal the connection between 
the theory assessment and the moral belief assessment. Finally, they 
were presented with four scenarios and, for each scenario, were asked 
to indicate how they would respond to the protagonist's behavior, how 
they would justify their responses, and what they would say to the 
protagonist if they were to talk to him or her privately. 
Two scenarios were identical to the duty-violation scenarios used in 
Study 3, except that the names of the protagonists were changed to 
Chinese names. The other two were new scenarios that could be seen 
both ways, either as duty violations or rights violations. These ambigu- 
ous scenarios could evoke both duty-based and rights-based justifi- 
cations for recommended actions and thus allowed us to test the predic- 
tion that entity theorists would be more likely to justify their recom- 
mended actions with duty-based reasons, whereas incremental theorists 
would be more likely to justify their recommended actions with rights- 
based reasons. The two ambiguous scenarios were (a) "Walman took 
a peek at his classmate's report card when his classmate was not in the 
classroom" (violation of classroom rule and others' right to privacy) 
and (b) "Wingmin took from the class library a book she liked and did 
not return it to the library" (violation of library regulations and other 
students' right to read the book). 
Two independent coders who were blind to the participants' theories 
coded the responses to the scenarios using the coding scheme developed 
for Study 3. Intercoder reliability was 99% ( r  = .96) for punishment, 
96% (K = .81 ) for duty-based justifications, 90% (r  = .81 ) for direc- 
tives, and 92% (K = .77) for assurance-negotiation. The coders also 
coded, for each scenario, whether or not the participants mentioned a 
rights-based justification for their responses. A response was classified 
as rights-based justifications when the participant justified his or her 
responses to the protagonist by (a) asserting the principle that others' 
rights should be respected or that everybody is entitled to his or her 
rights or (b) mentioning that the protagonist violated other people's 
rights. Examples of rights-based justifications were: "Human rights 
must be protected!" and "His behavior violated his classmate's right 
to privacy." 
Intercoder agreement was 96% (K = .76) for this variable. As in 
Study 3, responses that fit the coding criteria for a variable in a scenario 
were given a score of 1 on that variable for that scenario. Otherwise, 
they were given a score of 0 on that variable for that scenario. For each 
variable, scores for duty violation scenarios and the ambiguous scenarios 
were aggregated. Accordingly, for the duty violation scenarios and for 
the ambiguous scenarios, the possible range of score for each variable 
was 0 to 2. 
Results 
On the basis of the criteria used in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
62 participants were classified as entity theorists and 17 were 
classified as incremental theorists. Recall that the number of 
entity theorists and incremental theorists was roughly equal in 
American samples in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4. Across the four 
studies, the ratio of entity theorists to incremental theorists was 
1.09 to 1. However, in the Chinese sample in Study 5, the ratio 
was 3.65 to 1. The difference in the relative distribution of entity 
versus incremental theorists in the American samples and the 
Chinese sample was statistically reliable, X2(1, N = 303) = 
16.64, p < .001. Such difference is consistent with our idea 
that entity versus incremental theory coheres with a duty- versus 
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rights-based moral orientation. As noted, previous research as 
found that compared with Americans, Chinese are more duty 
oriented and less rights oriented in their moral beliefs. The 
present research shows that in a society in which duty-based 
morality is dominant, there tend to be relatively more entity 
theorists. 5 
Punishment, directives, and assurance-negotiation. An 
Implicit Theory (entity vs. incremental) x Scenario Type (duty 
violation vs. ambiguous cenarios) ANOVA was performed on 
the likelihood of punishment assignment. Neither the implicit 
theory main effect nor the interaction effect was significant. 
However, as in Study 3, entity theorists were more likely to 
punish the target han were incremental theorists (M = 0.20 vs. 
0.09), although the difference was not significant, F(1, 77) = 
1.11, ns. Most participants indicated that they would want to 
know more about he transgressor's motivation before they made 
their decisions about punishment. Such a response tendency, 
which is consistent with the more contextualized approach to 
social knowing among Asians (see Miller & Bersoff, 1994; 
Morris & Peng, 1994), could have imposed a ceiling on entity 
theorists' tendency to recommend punishment in the present 
study. 
We thus looked at how entity and incremental theorists would 
talk to the child. As in Study 3, entity theorists were significantly 
more likely than incremental theorists to issue orders and direc- 
tives (M = 1.19 vs. 0.65). An Implicit Theory x Scenario 
Type interaction ANOVA performed on the likelihood of using 
directives revealed a highly significant implicit theory main ef- 
fect, F(1, 77) = 8.28, p < .01. Both scenario type main effect 
and the interaction were not significant (F  < 1 ). Thus, entity 
theorists issued more orders and directives for both types of 
scenarios. 
By contrast, incremental theorists were much more likely to 
use assurance and negotiation when they talked to the child (M 
= 0.74 vs. 0.15), F( 1, 77) = 30.66,p < .001. Both the scenario 
type main effect and the Implicit Theory x Scenario Type inter- 
action were not significant. In short, as in Study 3, entity theo- 
rists, in line with a more duty-based moral orientation, were 
more likely than incremental theorists to use directives and less 
likely to use assurance-negotiation t  deal with undesirable 
behaviors. 
Duty- and rights-based justifications. An Implicit Theory 
x Scenario Type x Type of Justification (duty based vs. rights 
based) performed on the justifications provided by the partici- 
pants revealed a significant ype of justification main effect, 
F(1, 77) = 4.66, p < .05, a significant Scenario Type x Type 
of Justification interaction, F( 1, 77) = 29.92, p < .001, and a 
significant Implicit Theory x Type of Justification interaction, 
F(1, 77) = 7.00, p < .01. No other effects were significant. 
Participants offered more duty-based (M = 0.32) than rights- 
based justifications (M = 0.10). However, the relative preva- 
lence of duty-based and rights-based justification was also re- 
lated to scenario type: As in Study 3, the duty violations cenar- 
ios solicited uty-based justifications (M = 0.53), but no rights- 
based justifications (M = 0.0). As we expected, the ambiguous 
scenarios generated both duty-based justifications (M = 0.11 ) 
and rights-based justifications (M = 0.20). 
Were entity theorists more likely than incremental theorists 
to offer duty-based justifications for their action in the duty 
violation scenarios? In addition, did entity theorists tend to relate 
the undesirable behaviors depicted in the ambiguous cenarios 
to duty violation? Did incremental theorists tend to relate the 
same behaviors to rights infringement? The significant Implicit 
Theory x Type of Justification interaction indicated that entity 
theorists were more likely to offer duty-based justifications (M 
= 0.36) than rights-based justifications (M = 0.07), t(78) = 
5.00, p < .001, and that incremental theorists were more likely 
than entity theorists to offer rights-based justifications (M = 
0.21 vs. 0.07), t(77) = -2.30, p < .05. As Table 4 shows, 
consistent with our predictions, entity theorists were more likely 
than incremental theorists to offer duty-based justifications for 
both types of scenarios. In addition, for the ambiguous cenar- 
ios, incremental theorists offered only rights-based justifications 
(M = 0.41 ) and no duty-based justifications (M = 0.0), whereas 
entity theorists offered the same number of duty-based justifica- 
tions and rights-based justifications (M = 0.15). 
Summary. The present research found that, as expected, 
there were more entity theorists among Chinese students than 
among American students. Despite this finding, among Chinese 
students, those who subscribed to an entity theory of social- 
moral reality were more likely to reason and respond in ways 
that were consistent with duty-based moral beliefs than were 
those who subscribed to a malleable theory. 
General  Discussion 
Taken together, this research shows that individuals' implicit 
theories and their moral beliefs are internally coherent. Specifi- 
cally, in both the United States (a relatively rights-oriented coun- 
try) and Hong Kong (a relatively duty-oriented society), indi- 
viduals who conceive of the world and other people's moral 
character as fixed tend to have a stronger preference for duty- 
based moral beliefs than do individuals who conceive of these 
factors as malleable. In contrast, incremental theorists tend to 
have a stronger preference for rights-based moral beliefs than do 
entity theorists. How do we account for this consistent relation 
between implicit theories and moral beliefs? Although these 
findings are highly consistent, hey may seem somewhat novel. 
Therefore, we will first consider some possible alternative 
explanations. 
Some Possible Alternative Explanations 
Self-presentation. As noted in Study 1, neither the morality 
theory measure nor the world theory measure is correlated with 
standard measures of self-presentation concerns (e.g., the Social 
Desirability Scale, Paulhus, 1984, and the Self-Monitoring 
Scale, Snyder, 1974; see Dweck, et al., 1995b). Thus, it is not 
s It is interesting to note that in the Hong Kong sample, 85% of 
the "unclassified" participants (those with one entity theory and one 
incremental theory) endorsed an entity world theory and an incremental 
morality theory (compared with 43% of the unclassifieds in the United 
States ample). When one also considers the classified participants, the 
Hong Kong sample showed an overwhelming belief in a fixed world, 
but not necessarily a fixed moral character. 
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Table 4 
The Relation of Implicit Theories to Duty-Based and Rights- 
Based Justifications (Study 5) 
Entity Incremental 
theorists theorists 
(n = 62) (n = 17) 
Scenario M SD M SD 
Duty violation 
Duty-based justifications .58 .71 .35 .61 
Rights-based justifications .00 .00 .00 .00 
Ambiguous 
Duty-based justifications .15 .36 .00 .00 
Rights-based justifications .15 .36 .41 .62 
that incremental theorists are more likely than entity theorists to 
want to present themselves more favorably by endorsing rights- 
based moral beliefs or by recommending less punishment. 
Optimism-pessimism. Intuitively, one may think that indi- 
viduals who believe that people's morality or the world are fixed 
are more pessimistic than those who believe that these factors 
can be changed. Moreover, those who have a more negative view 
of others and the wodd may also want people to operate on 
duties and not on rights, and they may want to punish immoral 
behavior to enforce morality. However, these intuitions were not 
supported by the data from our research. In Study 1, confidence 
in other people and the world was not correlated with either the 
world theory (r = . 12) or the morality theory (r = . 17). More 
important, as Table 3 shows, the confidence measures did not 
predict preference for duty-based versus rights-based morality 
as the theory measure did. These findings uggest that the rela- 
tion between implicit theories and moral beliefs found in this 
research was not mediated by optimism-pessimism. 
Relation to other individual differences variables. Does a 
preference for duty-based and rights-based morality reflect he 
participants' political conservatism and liberalism? If it does, 
to what extent was the relation between implicit theories and 
moral beliefs found in this research mediated by conservatism- 
liberalism or by other individual difference variables that have 
been found to correlate with conservatism and liberalism (e.g., 
the just world belief and locus of control)? 
First, it should be noted that duty- versus rights-based moral- 
ity is distinct from conservatism and liberalism at the defini- 
tional evel. By definition, conservatism is a set of social politi- 
cal beliefs that emphasize social stability and a distrust in popu- 
lar democracy, whereas liberalism is a set of social political 
beliefs that emphasize progressive social change and popular 
democracy (Kerlinger, 1984). Both conservatives and liberals 
endorse rights, although they may place higher priorities on 
different kinds of rights. For instance, whereas conservatives 
place more emphasis on property rights and the right to enjoy 
the wealth one has accumulated, liberals tend to emphasize the 
rights of minorities. Finally, duty is not central to the definitions 
of conservatism and liberalism. Indeed, in Kerlinger's tudy of 
social concepts, "duty" did not load on either the conservatism 
factor or the liberalism factor. 
Consistent with this, in one validation study of the implicit 
theories measures ( ee Dweck et al., 1995b), participants were 
also given Kerlinger's (1984) Social Attitudes Referent Scale 
IV and the Social Attitude Scale. In this study, neither the moral- 
ity theory nor the world theory measure correlated with conser- 
vatism or liberalism measured by the two Kerlinger scales. 
Furthermore, in another validation study (see Dweck et al., 
1995b), no difference was found between entity theorists (n = 
41 ) and incremental theorists of the world and morality (n = 
48) on the Just World Belief Scale (a scale shown to be corre- 
lated with conservatism - liberalism), t (87 ) = 1.61, n s. Finally, 
the participants in Study 1 also filled out the Levenson (1974) 
locus of control questionnaire. As the discriminant function 
analyses ummarized in Table 3 revealed, when the effects of 
implicit heories and locus of control were considered together, 
implicit heories remained significant predictors of duty- versus 
rights-based morality. 
In summary, not only do these findings attest o the discrimi- 
nant validity of implicit heories, they also point to the potential 
theoretical importance of distinguishing duty-based versus 
rights-based morality from political conservatism and liberalism 
in future research. 
A Meaning System Approach to Moral Beliefs: 
A Proposal 
How do we account for the seemingly robust relation between 
implicit heories and moral beliefs? 
Given the current view that much of cognitive and personality 
development consists of the construction f personal epistemolo- 
gies or meaning systems (Epstein, 1989; Janoff-Bulman, 1985; 
Murphy & Medin, 1985 ), we propose that implicit heories may 
be viewed as basic assumptions in an individual's belief or 
meaning system in a particular domain. Such a system serves 
many functions. For example, it represents and organizes ex- 
isting knowledge and beliefs and provides a framework for un- 
derstanding the meaning of events in that domain. In the moral 
domain, the present research demonstrates how an individual's 
implicit theories may provide a framework for judging (a) 
whether astate of affairs is moral and (b) what kind of responses 
would be appropriate. 
Entity theorists, by definition, believe in a more static, stable 
social-moral order. To them, the major sources of moral ac- 
t ions-other people or the world and its institutions--are b - 
lieved to be fixed. In such a static moral order, the defining 
moral issue is whether the sources of moral actions conform to 
a set of duties and obligations prescribed by a stable and orderly 
system. The existing codes of conduct are seen as of fundamen- 
tal value, and the primary function of justice and morality is to 
maintain such codes. Thus, to entity theorists, compared with 
incremental theorists, violations of the existing codes of conduct 
(e.g., role expectations) are seen as less acceptable (Study 1 ), 
and moral conformity and maintenance of societal stability are 
seen as more important than individual rights and liberty (Study 
2). Consistent with this orientation, entity theorists are less 
tolerant of deviance. To preserve the status quo, they are more 
prepared to sanction undesirable behavior (Studies 3 and 4), 
and they are relatively more likely to enforce morality by impos- 
ing punishment (Studies 3 and 4), restating the moral obliga- 
tions or issuing moral directives to the "transgressors" (Studies 
3 and 5 ). They also tend to believe that good conduct represents 
938 CHIU, DWECK, TONG, AND FU 
merely doing one's duty and does not deserve reward. Thus, 
compared with incremental theorists, they also tend to be less 
appreciative of good conduct (Study 3). 
In contrast, incremental theorists, by definition, believe in a 
malleable, perhaps evolving social-moral reality. Each moral 
agent is capable of developing his or her individual morality. In 
this dynamic view of the social-moral reality, the existing so- 
cial-moral order does not have absolute moral authority over 
individual moral agents. Instead, social actions hould be guided 
by such moral principles as individual rights and liberty. The 
defining moral issue is whether the existing social arrangement, 
codes of conduct, and life practices are working to foster and 
protect individual rights and liberty. Moreover, the status quo 
can be changed when these lements become obstructive ofthese 
ends. As stated in the Declaration of Independence, "govern- 
ments long established should not be changed for light and 
transient causes," but such changes are justified after "a long 
chain of abuses [ of human rights ] ." Consistent with this orien- 
tation, incremental theorists, compared with entity theorists, 
tend to find rights infringement more morally objectionable 
(Study 1 ), and they are less likely to agree to sacrifice individual 
rights and freedom for the purpose of maintaining societal stabil- 
ity (Study 2). Moreover, believing that undesirable behaviors 
do not represent a failure to fulfill one's moral obligations and 
that individuals are capable of developing their morality, com- 
pared with entity theorists, incremental theorists are appreciative 
of good behavior and believe less in punishment and more in 
negotiation and education (Studies 3, 4, and 5). 
In short, the belief that the social-moral reality is fixed is 
more strongly associated with (a) a moral orientation i which 
the major sources of moral actions (individuals and institutions) 
are expected to fulfull a set of prescribed uties and (b) a 
primary concern with maintaining the status quo. In contrast, a
belief that the social-moral reality is malleable ismore strongly 
associated with (a) a moral orientation i which moral actions 
and social practices are guided by such moral principles as 
individual rights and (b) the belief that the status quo can be 
changed to foster and promote individual rights. 
Implications for Future Research 
What are the implications of this meaning system approach 
for future research on the relations among moral beliefs, moral 
goals, and moral action? Previous tudies have shown that the 
correspondence b tween moral cognition and moral action is 
often low (Mischel & Mischel, 1976). In part this lack of corre- 
spondence may be because moral cognitions are not always 
translated into moral actions. As Rest (1983) and Dweck and 
Leggett (1988) have suggested, what is missing in most cogni- 
tive theories of morality is the motivational mechanism that 
would translate a moral decision into a moral action. For exam- 
ple, many individuals who feel that inequalities and infringement 
of rights are unjust or immoral and who perceive that these 
injustices could potentially be rectified may do little themselves 
to redress these injustices. One possible xplanation is that solv- 
ing such problems i  not a salient goal in their day-to-day activ- 
i ty - i t  is not a priority compared with other personal goals. 
Thus, further esearch is needed to determine the role of goal 
value or salience in prompting moral action. 
Moreover, even when individuals are committed to solving a 
particular moral issue, the ways in which they approach this 
issue are inevitably affected by what they believe about morality, 
by what they construe as a moral situation, by what they define 
as a just or moral act, by what they believe to be appropriate 
responses to unjust or immoral acts, and by their particular 
moral goals (Rest, 1983). As this research suggests, each of 
these may be related to an individual's implicit worldview. For 
example, different theorists may have different ideas about what 
constitutes an appropriate r sponse to immoral acts. In Studies 
3, 4, and 5, in the face of undesirable behaviors, entity theorists 
appeared to believe more strongly than incremental theorists 
that the appropriate action was to reprimand the transgressor. 
In contrast, incremental theorists seemed to believe more 
strongly in assurance and negotiation i these situations. 
This pattern implies that entity theorists and incremental theo- 
rists may pursue different moral goals. Indeed, although not 
addressed directly in this research, in Studies 3, 4 and 5, entity 
and incremental theorists appeared to have different goals in 
their proposed interactions with the "transgressors." Entity the- 
orists' goal was to mete out consequences for rule or rights 
violations, whereas incremental theorists' goal was to clarify 
the options for the transgressors and bolster their confidence so 
that they could attain their self-chosen goal (cf. Dweck & Leg- 
gett, 1988, discussion of how entity theories promote "judgment 
goals" and how incremental theories promote "development 
goals"). In short, the meaning system approach we have pro- 
posed can potentially be used as a lead to explore the relations 
among moral cognitions, moral goals, and moral actions. 
Furthermore, past research as found clear cross-cultural dif- 
ferences in the conception of morality, with Western countries 
being more oriented toward fights-based morality and Asian 
countries more oriented toward duty-based morality (e.g., 
Chiu & Hong, 1997; Shweder & Miller, 1985). As shown in 
the present research, there appear to be more entity theorists 
among Hong Kong Chinese than among Americans. Since an 
entity theory is linked to duty-based morality, the differences 
between American and Asian societies in the relative importance 
of duties versus rights may be related to the differences in 
the distribution of entity versus incremental theorists in these 
societies. This possibility should be of interest o researchers 
who study cross-cultural differences in moral values. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the coherent organization of meaning within a 
person has emerged as a prominent topic in psychology during 
the 1980s. We have suggested one such meaning system. The 
fixed versus malleable belief may also be core beliefs that define 
different worldviews (Dweck et al., 1995a). For example, Al- 
fred North Whitehead (1929, 1938) used the static versus dy- 
namic dimension to compare and contrast different scientific 
systems and theories. Piaget and Garcia (1983) viewed the 
static-changing distinction as a basic distinction that differenti- 
ates various conceptions of the world. Finally, Pepper (1942) 
identified four different worldviews, which he believed could 
be combined into two more central meaning systems, one char- 
acterized by the existence of fixed relations among static onstit- 
uent elements and the other by a more dynamic, malleable sys- 
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tem of processes (see also Johnson, Germer, Efran, & Overton, 
1988). Although the theory we propose here is tentative and 
subject to refinement by future research, we believe it opens 
up possibilities for investigating moral beliefs, moral decision 
making, and moral behavior within an individual's meaning 
system. 
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